Prometheus: Such are the inventions I devised for mankind, Yet have myself no cunning wherewith
the character Protagoras expands upon the ancient myth. After the gods created 4 mortal creatures, they assigned to Prometheus (whose name means "forethought") and his brother Epimetheus ("afterthought") the task of giving each mortal creature the equipment it would need to live well. Epimetheus persuaded Prometheus to let him do the job, and he invited Prometheus to examine his work when it was done. So, it was Epimetheus who gave speed to some animals and strength to others; the power of flight went to a few, whereas others received underground habitation; some ate from the trees, others roots, and "to a certain number for food he gave other creatures to devour." In this way each was given the power 5 to preserve itself. Protagoras continues:
Epimetheus, being not so wise as he might be, heedlessly squandered his stock of properties on the brutes; he still had left unequipped the race of men, and was at a loss what to do with it. As he was casting about, Prometheus arrived to examine his distribution, and saw that whereas other creatures were fully and suitably provided, man was naked, unshod, unbedded, unarmed; and already the destined day was come whereon man like the rest should emerge from earth to light. Then Prometheus, in his perplexity as to what preservation he could devise for man, stole from Hephaestus and Athena wisdom in the arts together with fire-and he handed it there and then as a gift to man. 6 Now we come to the part Aeschylus left out. "Although man acquired in this way the wisdom of daily life, civic wisdom [politike techne] he had not, since this was in the possession of Zeus." 7 The point of all this is that Prometheus suffers because he stole part of what humans need to live, but the most important part-civic wisdom-was lacking. Without civic wisdom human beings are a menace to themselves, to other creatures, and to the earth itself. This has since become clear in the current ecological crisis. Prometheus, the forethinker, should have known better. Technological mastery, without civic wisdom, spells disaster. Zeus was ready to do away with the whole human race, but Prometheus, out of compassion, interfered and left us with a problem that is still unresolved. That is why he was chained to a rock and an eagle was sent to feast daily upon his liver. Zeus then sent Hermes to give human beings "civic art" [politike techne] "to bring respect and right among men, to the end that there should be regulation of cities and friendly ties to draw them together." But here things become complicated. 8 Hermes asked Zeus whether he should distribute civic wisdom to all people or whether it should be distributed as the other arts were dealt-with one person possessing medical art and treating many ordinary people, one person being a carpenter for many, etc. The answer was that it should be distributed to all alike: "Let all have their share; for cities cannot be formed if only a few have a share of these as of other arts." Here is the voice of the new democracy 9 speaking clearly and eloquently.
Protagoras contends both that there is civic virtue [arete] and that it can be taught to all people. But another of Plato's characters, Socrates, has a few questions to pose concerning this bold vision of civic virtue and how it is to be distributed. Virtue seems not to be one thing, certainly not one upon which all people agree, but many things (knowledge, temperance, justice, courage, holiness, etc.), each distinct from the other, sometimes even in conflict. Rather than being distributed equally, certain people possess some of these virtues and lack others. Some have courage and lack knowledge, some possess holiness but 10 not justice, and still others have knowledge but not holiness. If civic virtue is to be taught to all, it would seem that a great teacher like Protagoras should know what virtue is, be able to define it, and be able to teach it. Subsequent discussion in Plato's dialogue makes it clear that Protagoras is unable to answer Socrates' objections, and therefore, is incapable of defining civic virtue and unable to teach it to all people.
But is there no hope? Is there no such thing as political wisdom? Is it impossible to articulate and teach civic virtue? These are philosophical questions, so I think it is philosophers who bear the responsibility for answering them. The ecological crisis has spawned a series of attempts to link ecology and values, to correct the wrong-headed approaches to ethical and political values which have failed so miserably in the modern world. But perhaps the source of the difficulty is not confined to the modern world. Perhaps it is Protagoras himself who pointed us in the wrong direction when he claimed that "man is the measure of all things" and wrongly tried to locate value judgments in human consciousness. To say that "man is the measure of all things" can mean (1) If humanism is taken as a form of "human chauvinism," as some have claimed, it offers a subjectivist or a relativist ethic (or both). We need to go 15 beyond humanism. In 1948 Aldo Leopold wrote that there is as yet no ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it. Land, like Odysseus' slave girls, is still property. The land-relation is still strictly economic, entailing privileges but not obligations. 16 Following Leopold, Callicott seeks to establish "the land ethic" which contends that "a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise." argues, because all sentient creatures can participate in some version of moral or social sentiment which evolves in higher mammals into what we commonly consider to be rational ethics but which, originally, is grounded in feeling. What "is" and what "ought to be" have the same source-moral sentiment. This, he insists, results in a "holistic" ethic which avoids the Is/Ought dichotomy.
But there is a fatal flaw in Callicott's approach; in attempting to avoid the Is/Ought dichotomy, he creates an equally pernicious schism between feeling (sentiment) and reason, removing any hope that rational beings (such as humans) 24 who do make choices on the basis of reason, can find genuine unity and harmony with creatures which lack reason. Once reason overrides feeling, takes priority over feeling, as it often does, any attempt to ground values in feeling fails. No matter how much pleasure I derive from unjust acts, no matter how "good" they make me feel, they should be avoided.
Callicott is right about one thing; it is important to establish a holistic approach to values so that human beings, other animals, and the land itself are incorporated into a vision of reality which makes it possible to respond intelligently to the ecological crisis (as well as a host of other value questions). Where are we to look for such a vision? Callicott suggests that we return to Plato for guidance, contending that "ethical holism" is supported by Plato's moral and social philosophy. But his use of Plato's philosophy is misguided. He applauds 26 27
Plato's "complete indifference" to the pain and suffering of individual human beings, praising Socrates' response to Adeimantus' complaint at the beginning of Book IV of The Republic that his proposed society ignores human happiness. It is the well-being of the community as a whole, not that of any person or special class, at which his ideal community aims. The Republic (and Plato's other dialogues as well) is a vision of ethics which is grounded in being and goodness, one far superior to that of modern philosophers who separate ethics from ontology and then seek to pull values out of a magic hat. To ground ethics in being does not commit the "naturalistic fallacy," because there is no such fallacy. This becomes clear when Moore explains what he means in "philosophic terminology." He says that "propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic." The naturalistic fallacy could exist 34 only if we were to accept the analytic/synthetic distinction. I have argued elsewhere that the arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction are convincing and that it should be abandoned once and for all. Plato embraced no 35 dualism between "is" and "ought." On the contrary, the ontology which is developed in The Republic (and a variety of other dialogues) soundly rejects any such bifurcation. Knowing cannot be separated either from reason or from experience. Knowing, reasoning, and experiencing are grounded in being and goodness.
Socrates does not provide a positive and unified concept of civic virtue in the Protagoras. His task there is to show that Protagoras lacked such a vision and, as a result, that his interpretation of the Prometheus myth was incoherent. Socrates points out at the end of the dialogue that he and Protagoras have traded places. Protagoras began by claiming that virtue can be taught, but his subsequent answers to Socrates' questions led him to the view that it cannot be taught-"for if virtue were anything else than knowledge, as Protagoras tried to make out, obviously it would not be teachable." Socrates, after having said at first that 36 virtue cannot be taught, changes his mind and seeks "to prove that all things are knowledge-justice, temperance, and courage-which is the best way to make virtue appear teachable." Socrates concludes that dialogue by returning to the 37 myth. He says:
I like the Prometheus of your fable better than the Epimetheus; for he is of use to me, and I take Promethean thought continually for my own life when I am occupied with all these questions. 38 The conversation with Protagoras ends at that point, but not before Socrates suggests a way out of our plight. Promethean thought serves as Socrates' guide, and I think it can do the same for us.
But what, pray tell, is "Promethean thought" as Socrates now uses the term? We can begin by saying what it is not: 1. It is not "Epimethean thought." It is forethought rather than afterthought. For example our thinking about the ecological crisis has tended to be "afterthought," especially when it comes to putting our thought into action.
It is not technology separated from civic wisdom [politike techne].
Contemporary human beings have acquired the bad habit of thinking either that there is no such thing as knowledge or that it is separated into compartments which are sealed off from each other. The techne of carpentry allows us to build houses, but then we thoughtlessly neglect to "turn them toward the sun," making it necessary to heat them with oil. We have the know-how to construct passive solar heat, but we lack the civic wisdom to incorporate it into our communities.
3. It is not manifested in rhetoric, the pseudo-art practiced by an "orator"
[rhetor] such as Protagoras. On the topic of teaching civic virtue, the character Socrates in Plato's Phaedrus points out that the real issue is whether the person speaking knows the difference between good and evil and is able to promote the good rather than the evil. Too often the political speaker does not know the difference but nevertheless attempts to "persuade the state which is equally ignorant . . . by praising evil under the name of good . . . and having studied the opinions of the multitude persuades them to do evil instead of good." 4. It is not analytic, synthetic, a priori, a posteriori, synthetic a priori, or any other permutation of these terms. Those distinctions emerged long after Plato's time, and they lead to a serious distortion of Plato's philosophy when we utilize them in interpreting his dialogues. This practice is responsible for many of the misleading interpretations of Plato's dialogues which pervade the modern world. For example, to say that the "forms" [ta eide] which are discussed in many of the dialogues are "a priori" is an anachronism leading many readers of Plato to think he was an epistemological dualist, a follower of René Descartes. Plato was not a follower of Descartes. Reason appears to be a delicate, variable, and recently emerged faculty. It cannot, under any circumstances, be supposed to have evolved in the absence of complex linguistic capabilities which depend, in turn, for their evolution upon a highly developed social matrix. But we cannot have become social beings unless we assumed limitations on freedom of action in the struggle for existence. Hence we must have become ethical before we became rational. 40 It is true that the explicit use of reason by human beings is a relatively late development in the evolutionary process, but that does not mean ethics must rest upon some more primitive impulse. Callicott's argument is based upon the assumption that ethical action consists largely of imposing "limitations on freedom of action in the struggle for existence." I question that assumption, along with the negative definition of freedom and the narrow concept of reason it entails. For human beings to be social, to live harmoniously with others, requires civic wisdom (one of the manifestations of reason). But this does not imply that other animals are irrational just because they lack "complex linguistic abilities." Promethean thinking, as Plato developed it throughout his dialogues, entails a much broader conception of reason than this, one which pervades being itself.
6. It is not the private property of professional philosophers. It belongs to all "lovers of wisdom."
This brings us to Plato's positive view of rationality. Full development of that notion requires a much longer treatment than is possible in this paper, but I shall characterize it briefly. In direct opposition to the rhetoric of Sophists such as Protagoras, Thrasymachus, Lysias, and Gorgias, Socrates cites "two principles, the essence of which it would be gratifying to learn, if art [ techne] could teach it." What are these principles? The Greek terms are diairesis and 41 sunagoge, which mean, respectively, "dividing" and "bringing together." Here we must be careful not to view Plato's meaning through lenses which have been polished by analytic philosophers in the twentieth century. Here is how Socrates uses these terms: Now I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of these processes of division and bringing together, as aids to speech and thought; and if I think any other man is able to see things that can naturally be collected into one and divided into many, him I follow after and "walk in his footsteps as if he were a god." And whether the name I give to those who can do this is right or wrong, God knows, but I have called them hitherto dialecticians.
42
The term "Promethean thinking," as Socrates used it in the Protagoras, is another name for "dialectic" as it is used in Phaedrus, The Republic, and a variety of What is most important about the dialectical method is that it is used to think about the nature of things, about being itself (in contrast to the Sophists who speak only about appearances). In "dividing by classes," we should search for "where the natural joints are, and not try to break any part, after the manner of a bad carver." Such metaphors about the natural forms of things abound in 44 Socrates' explication of the dialectical process in Phaedrus. The art of medicine is one of those given to human beings by Prometheus. This is a genuine art, not the sort of pseudo-art favored by the Sophists. We must follow what is natural, in medicine, in poetry, and in civic virtue. The way this is achieved is through to promote health and strength in the body by prescribing medicine and diet and through proper discussion to promote virtue in the soul. This is the "art of speaking" which can properly be called an art [techne] . This is the art which Socrates practices. Its highest form of development so far is to be found in the dialogues of Plato. It is there that we find Socrates trying to expand the arts brought by Prometheus (medicine, astronomy, carpentry, etc.) to include politike techne, the art required for human beings who naturally live in cities. That is the art nurtured by dialectic. It is through dialectic, through genuine philosophy, that civic virtue can be made available to mankind.
Zeus therefore, fearing the total destruction of our race, sent Hermes to impart to men the qualities of respect for others and a sense of justice, so as to bring order into our cities and create a bond of friendship and union.
Hermes asked Zeus in what manner he was to bestow these gifts on men. "Shall I distribute them as the arts were distributed-that is, on the principle that one trained doctor suffices for many laymen, and so with the other experts? Shall I distribute justice and respect for their fellows in this way, or to all alike?" "To all," said Zeus. "Let all have their share. There could never be cities if only a few shared in these virtues, as in the arts. Moreover, you must lay it down as my law that if anyone is incapable of acquiring his share of these two virtues he shall be put to death as a plague to the city." 19. Ibid., p. 13. Consider also the following discussion in Chapter II: "The theories I propose to discuss may be divided into two groups. The naturalistic fallacy always implies that when we think 'This is good,' what we are thinking is that the thing in question bears a definite relation to some one other thing. But this one thing by reference to what is good is defined, may be either what I call a natural object-something of which the existence is admittedly an object of experience-or else it may be an object which is only inferred to exist in a supersensible real world. . . . It should be observed that the fallacy, by reference to which I define 'Metaphysical Ethics,' is the same in kind, and I give it but one name, the naturalistic fallacy" (ibid., pp. 38-39).
20. "If I am asked 'What is good' my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked 'How is good to be defined?' my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it" ( ibid., p. 6).
21 26. "Indeed, two of the same analogies figuring in the conceptual foundations of the Leopold land ethic appear in Plato's value theory. This wording is meant to reflect Friedrich Rapp's observation that people power presupposes participatory democracy as its instrument. From the ecological perspective, according to Leopold, land is like an organic body or like a human society. According to Plato, body, soul, and society have similar structures and corresponding virtues. The goodness of each is a function of its structure or organization and the relative value of the parts or constituents of each is calculated according to the contribution made to the integrity, stability, and beauty of each whole" (ibid., p. 28).
